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Between 1985 and 1987, R. Foster Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, 
received convictions for violating section l0(b) and Rule l0b-5 of the Securities and Exchange 
Act as well as engaging in mail fraud. 1 
Foster Winans was one of several different reporters for the Wall Street Journal that took 
part in the writing of the daily column, "Heard on the Street" (hereinafter HOS). HOS reported 
mostly opinions from different industry analysts, portfolio managers, and company sources on 
specific companies and usually gave a their recommendation on whether they thought the 
company was a "buy" or a "sell." 
In October of 1983, Winans met with a top broker for Kidder Peabody, Peter Brant. They 
subsequently agreed that Winans would leak information about the upcoming article to Brant the 
day before its release, and Brant would then trade on that information. The information leaked 
included the company mentioned and the overall opinion about that company; whether it was a 
buy or a sell. All information was to be kept pure in that nothing would be fabricated about the 
company solely for the purpose of influencing the stock. Brant would execute the trade late in 
the afternoon on the day before the article was published then close out his position after the 
article's public release. 
The trading scheme between Winans and Brant lasted from October 1983 to February 
1984. Over this time, twenty-seven articles were leaked in advance, some of which were not 
written by Winans. Shortly after, the SEC was investigating Winans on grounds of insider 
trading. Because the information they traded on had already been declared public, the SEC had 
to prove to the courts that the article itself was an important information event - meaning its 
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publication represented an important information event above and beyond the public information 
contained in the article. Foster Winans was convicted of insider trading, and the conviction was 
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in November 1987.2 
The introduction of R. Foster Winans and his story gives an account as to the backdrop in 
which this paper is written. The articles written during this time were full of speculative 
opinions as well as fresh, up to the minute facts. Since Winans' conviction, the Wall Street 
Journal has been careful to prevent new information dissemination and such strong opinions 
from being expressed in its HOS column. 2 
Winans involvement in the insider trading scandal caused several articles to be published 
in the subsequent years regarding whether or not the "Heard on the Street" column had enough 
impact to drive the market. 
Studies done by Syed, Liu, and Smith3 (hereinafter SLS) along with articles by Beck-
Dudley and Stephens 4 give conflicting results as to the importance of the information leaked 
about the content of the forthcoming HOS articles by Winans. SLS argue that the information 
leaked was significant enough to cause a market response. Beck-Dudley and Stephens disagree 
with the conclusions made by SLS in that a small group of traders trading a relatively small 
number of shares could not generate the market response seen on the day preceding the release of 
the article . Forces other than the information leaks must have been taking place in the market 
that drove the movement in stock price. 
The following analysis shows that regardless of the events taking place before the event 
date, certain articles had more of an impact on the stock price on the day of publication than 
others. This paper will focus more on the content of the HOS articles as it deals with the 
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different types of people giving the recommendations as opposed to the overall buy/sell 
perspective. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether recommendations from different 
individuals mentioned in HOS affect the stock price in different ways. Generally speaking, does 
the recommendation of one type of person or analyst create a significantly different stock price 
movent than another. 
EVENT STUDIES 
The methodology used to study the impact that different analysts have on a company 's 
stock price is based on the event study methodology developed by Stephen J. Brown and Jerold 
B. Warner [3]. Event studies are statistical techniques that use empirical financial data to asses 
the impact of a particular event on the price of a firm's stock. At first glance, this may seem 
easier than it really is. On any given day there are a number of different elements that can 
influence the stock price. Factors such as interest rates, exchange rates, investor sentiment, 
inflation, and GDP estimates all have some contribution on the daily movements in the stock's 
price 5 • An equally-weighted index model that represents the entire New York Stock Exchange 
can be used as a good estimation of most of the forces at play in the market on any given day. 
Regression analysis comparing the specific stock movements with the equally-weighted 
index model gives estimates of a. and p for the equation 
where Rit is the expected return on the individual stock, i, for the time period t (in this case tis 
one day), ~ 1 is the return on the market index in time t, and eit is the error term that is used as a 
placeholder for the difference between the market return and the stock return that is not explained 
by the equation ai + Pim * Rmt· a and p are the parameters estimated by the regression analysis. 
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Pim is the firm specific coefficient that measures the sensitivity of the stock to the market and a i 
is the average excess return that the stock will realize given a zero market return 6• The previous 
equation of Rit = ai + Pim * Rm1 + eit imposes a maintained hypothesis of a linear relation between 
the stock returns and the index model. For this situation, it is believed to be an accurate 
assumption. 
The error term, ei1, is the parameter in which the analysis is based. It shows how much 
the firms stock price changes above and beyond what we would expect based on our market 
model (sometimes ei1 is referred to as the abnormal return or residual return). When the error 
term is small, the model has predicted the stock price movement fairly well. When the error term 
is large (becomes statistically significant), there may be other reasons for the stock's movement 
than can be explained by the market regression model. These other reasons usually entail new 
information that is released into the market about that particular stock. Items such as unexpected 
dividend announcements and unexpected mergers create large error terms. The new information 
changes investors opinions concerning the stock resulting in unusual price movements. 
The regression for this study used 250 days of daily data ranging from 260 days prior to 
the publication of the article (the event date), day t = -260, up to 11 days prior, day t = -11. This 
allows for the regression model to formulate expected returns for the stock given the market 
return over a relatively long period of time. The event date was not included in the regression to 
reduce bias that would result in the parameters. If the event date was included in the regression, 
the regression model would use what might be abnormal data in its computation of parameters. 
The following 20 days are plotted on graphs, from day t = -10 to day t = + 10, where the event 
date is day t = 0. 
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The error terms for each day, t = -10 through t = + 10, are recorded then combined with all 
the other companies within the particular subgroup. Even though the companies mentioned all 
have different publication dates, each one designates the day its article was published as day t = 
0. Aligning the different companies so that the event date now becomes the same for all firms , 
we can begin to look at the combined abnormal returns experienced on the day of the articles 
release. 
Under normal circumstances where no new information is released to the market , the 
error terms would tend to fluctuate around a value of zero (0). This is a result of the ordinary 
least squares method of regression, the method used to calculate the parameters in our model. It 
will be assumed that the distribution of the error terms falls into a normal or bell-shaped curve . 
The shape of this distribution is fundamental to our interpretation of the results. Without this 
assumption of a normal curve the hypothesis testing performed later in the article would be 
invalid. Under this type of distribution, where n is sufficiently large , approximately 98% of all 
values of the combined error term fall within ±2.326 standard deviations away from 0. 
When the values of the error terms fall outside ±2.326 standard deviations they are 
statistically significant at the a= .01 level of significance. 1 There is a strong argument that this 
value did not appear out of pure chance. As the test statistic moves increasingly further outsid e 
of the ±2.326 range, the possibility of a firm specific event driving the stock price becomes a 
1 This is correct when using a one-tailed test. The data is significant at a= .01 when the 
observations fall above +2.326 for the buy articles and below -2.326 for the sell articles. The 
other necessary condition for the validity of this statement is that the sample size is very large (n 
> 120). For many of the samples n is less than 120 yet as will be shown most of the test statistics 
will still be significant even at a= .005. 
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very realistic possibility. The significant test statistic varies depending upon how many 
observations are included in the group. The fewer the observations, the higher the test statistic 
needs to be to ensure significance at the specified a level. 
The nature of the articles is such that for our purposes it would be preferable to use a one-
tailed test when analyzing the significance of the test statistics we observe. The articles are 
arranged so that the "buy" articles are grouped separate from the "sell" articles". When looking 
at the graphs for the two different types of articles, it is obvious that it is unnecessary to use a 
two-tailed test when the data is so heavily biased either positive or negative (for the buy articles, 
the event date and the days immediately preceding the event date have positive values only . The 
opposite is true for sell recommendation articles). 
Because we are using a large number of firms in our samples , a statistically significant 
error term on the event date might imply that the article had some impact in moving the stock 
price. Depending on the content of the article, it may or may not cause a significant market 
response. 
DATA 
"Heard on the Street" is a daily column printed in the Wall Street Journal in Section C, 
Money and Investing . The Wall Street Journal is a nationally distributed newspaper delivered to 
many businesses and individuals well before the opening of the stock market. The majority of 
the individuals subscribers do not receive the Wall Street Journal until the delivery of the regular 
mail, sometimes as late as 4:00 to 5:00 pm. In most areas, this is long after the market has closed 
for the day . 
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HOS articles were taken from the beginning of January 1983 to the end of March 1983. 
Additional articles were used from September 1983 to March 1984. The stock price data used in 
this article comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) files. Companies that 
were listed in the Wall Street Journal's HOS column and had data listed in the CRSP files for the 
time periods in question were the companies ultimately used in the analysis . Before the 
screening, a total of 533 companies were listed in HOS. The elimination of 157 companies by 
the lack of data in the CRSP files left 376 companies that were distributed into 203 buy 
recommendations, 86 sell recommendations, and 87 neutral or no recommendations. The neutral 
articles were not used in the following analysis. When the analysis was performed , there were a 
small number of companies in both the buy and sell categories that were unaccessible in the 
CRSP data files for various reasons, therefore were excluded from the analysis. 
ORGANIZATION OF ARTICLES 
The HOS articles could have up to five different types of people making comments about 
any particular stock on any given day. Two of the types of people are named, meaning they have 
been identified within the article according to their name and position in the financial 
community. The other three are un-named; their position has been identified but their name was 
not revealed in the article. 
The two named categories , or subsets, are Named Industry Analyst and Named Portfolio/ 
Money Manager Analyst. The majority of the articles mention a named industry analyst. The 
named portfolio / money managers represent the second most prevalent group of opinions. 
Typically when a named industry analyst is not mentioned, a named portfolio / money manager 
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The un-named group has three categories; Analysts/ Un-named Source, Un-named 
Source But Affiliated, and Company Source. The analyst/ un-named source was most common 
among the three, but it does not have nearly the number of articles as either of the named groups . 
The other two un-named sources did not have enough data to perform an accurate analysis of 
their impact. The analysis of the three un-named and two named subsets will focus on the 
categories by themselves and in combination with each other. 
In addition to the subsets of articles based on the type of person mentioned, each subset is 
organized into up to three variations. These variations include any article that the type of person 
is mentioned in with all other analysts that may be included in the same article, the certain type 
of person in articles by themselves with no other analyst mentioned, and all articles that do not 
mention that particular type of person. 
The tables included at the end of this article are arranged into four columns. The first 
column is the day relative to the event - shown on the horizontal axis of the graphs. The second 
column is the combined decimal change in the stock price for the stocks in that particular 
subgroup. A value of .015 would indicate a 1.5% average excess return in stock value for all the 
stocks listed. These are plotted on the vertical axis of the graphs. The third column is the test 
statistic for each decimal value. This tells the significance for each of the different decimal 
values. Some values are so large they fall several standard deviations away from the mean. This 
results in a large or significant test statistic. The fourth and final column is the number of 




One of the most apparent indications of the different influence each of the subsets wield 
can be seen in the buy recommendation of the named portfolio / money manager. On the day of 
publication, t = 0, the impact of the article and its contents can be measured by a test statistic as 
described earlier. 
When all the articles with portfolio/ money managers mentioned are analyzed (60 in 
total) , there is a significant increase in the stock price on the day of publication. The t = 0 test 
statistic has a value of 4.31 as seen in Table 1. This is statistically significant at a = .00 l. In 
layman's terms, this means we can be 99.8% sure that this value has not happened purely by 
chance. Some outside influence other than that taken into account by the regression model has 
caused the stock price to increase. There is also a statistically significant movement upward in 
the day preceding the publication, t = -1. The test statistic value of 3 .16 is significant at a = .005. 
(We can be 99% sure of a firm specific event occurring on that day. What the reason and cause 
for this occurrence is, shall be left to another article.) 
The articles that did not mention any portfolio / money managers also had very 
significant increases in the day of publication and the two days prior. Day t = -2 and t = -1 both 
had test statistics of 3.26 and 3.47, respectively, significant at the a= .001 level of significance 
for 117 observations (Table 2). The day of publication's test statistic, 3.75, significant at a= 
.001, is an indication that the article had some influence in moving the stock price on that day. 
The graphs for the three subgroups are seen in Figures 1 - 3 (all the figures numerically 
correspond to the table they are representing). 
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The striking divergence between the first two subgroups mentioned and the subgroup that 
only mentioned named portfolio / money managers can be easily perceived. The other subgroups 
had significant increases in stock price on the event date and at least one day before . When 
portfolio / money managers are isolated so they are the only source mentioned in the article, 
there are absolutely no significant stock price movements. Ont= 0 the test statistic of .137 is not 
even significant at the a = .25 level of significance. Day t = -1 is similar and t = -2 is actually 
negative. Table 3 presents the specific values. This indicates that the mention of a named 
portfolio / money manager in a HOS column has no effect on the stock price of the company 
mentioned. 
Where it has just been shown that named portfolio / money managers, when mentioned in 
a HOS article, have no impact on the price of a company's stock, it can now be seen that named 
industry analysts have a very large impact. 
All articles that mention a named industry analyst are the first subgroup to be examined. 
With 137 observations, test statistics for the two days prior to the event date, t = -2 and t = -1, are 
statistically significant at the a= .001 level with values of 3.49 and 4.62, respectively. On day t 
= 0 the test statistic is significant with a value of 5.76 (Table 4). The companies mentioned in 
this subgroup experience a large excess return in stock price on the day of publication as well as 
the two preceding days. The day immediately following the event, t = + 1, is not significant at the 
a = .10 level. 
The articles that did not mention a named industry analyst showed no significant stock 
movements on or around the day of publication. The two days prior to the event date, t = -2 and t 
= -1, had test statistic values not significant at the a = . l O level (Table 5). On day t = 0 the value 
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of 1.19 was still not significant at u = .10. Days t = -4 and t = -3 both have test statistics that are 
significant at u = .05 and u = .025, respectively. This is unusual in that the subgroup of stocks 
moved upwards in price several days before the publication, but did not move when their articles 
became public. 
In comparison with the preceding subgroup, the articles that mention only a named 
industry analyst have a large increase in stock price on the day the articles were published. The 
test statistics for the previous two days, t = -2 and t = -1 are not significant at the u = .05 level 
(Table 6). The event date has a value of 4.40 that is significant at the u = .001 level. It can be 
inferred from the three subgroups just mentioned that named industry analysts have a strong 
influence on the stock price of the companies listed in the HOS articles. The increase in stock 
price on the two days before the event must have come from a different source than the named 
industry analyst recommendations. The graphs in Figures 4 - 6 clearly illustrate this effect. 
The next two subgroups of buy recommendations are fairly similar and will be discussed 
together. All articles with an analyst/ un-named source and all articles with any of the three un-
named sources have similar graphs in the range oft= -2 tot= 0 with one minor discrepancy. 
For the analyst/ un-named source articles, days t = -2 and t = -1 are both significant at the 
a. = . 001 level of significance for 22 observations. On day t = 0 the analyst / un-named source 
seems to have no impact on the market the day the article is released . 
The articles that mention all three un-named analysts show similar results. On the two 
days prior to publication there is a strong and significant increase in stock price at the a.= .001 
level. The day of publication's test statistic is significant only at u = .05 (Table 8). This is a 
much smaller increase than the previous two days indicating that the articles have only a minor 
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influence in moving the stock price. 
The similarity of the two subgroups comes from the overlap between the analyst/ un-
named sources and the combined un-named analysts. 22 of the 42 articles from the second 
subgroup are contained in the first. This explains the resemblance between the two graphs 
(Figures 7 and 8). The discrepancy comes on the day t = 0. The combined un-named analysts 
have more of an impact on the stock price than the analyst / un-named sources, which have 
relatively no impact. This would lead to the conclusion that while analyst/ un-named sources 
have little if any impact, the other two un-named analyst groups, un-named source but affiliated 
and company source have a much stronger impact on the market. 
When analyst / un-named sources are removed from the sample leaving only the buy 
recommendation articles that have excluded them, the results change noticeably (Table 9). For 
the three days prior to the event, t = -3, t = -2, and t = -1, the test statistics are significant at the et. 
= .01 level. On the day of publication, the value of the test statistic is 6.12. It is highly 
significant at the et.= .001 level. Because all other articles besides analyst/ un-named sources 
covers such a wide variety of analyst recommendations, we can not conclude that the lack of an 
analyst/ un-named source actually drives the market. We can infer though, the presence of an 
analyst/ un-named source does not make any significant contribution to the stock movement. 
The graphs presented in this article tend to follow a certain pattern over the 10 days 
following the event date. For the buy recommendations, after the articles were published, the 
average stock prices tended to have a slight upward drift in their cumulative daily residuals. This 
can be seen by the addition of the residuals for days t = + 1 to t = + 10 (graphs not shown). The 
sell recommendations also exhibited a cumulative upward movement over the next several days. 
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These findings are confirmed by the research done by Brown, et al.7 In their article , they 
concluded that investors, in exchange for the greater risk incurred by the unexpected event , they 
set the stock price below their expected value until the eventual outcome is gradually clarified. 
In which case, it does not matter if the new information was good or bad, the subsequent 
movements in price will be positive. 
Sell Recommendations 
The sell recommendation articles resemble the buy articles to a certain degree. There is a 
slight difference in the results that will be explained shortly. 
The articles that list only named industry analysts and those that list any article with a 
named industry analyst produce comparable results. From tables 10 and 11, the impact 
according to the daily combined stock movements which the test statistics are based , day t = 0 is 
greater for the subgroup that contains all articles of named industry analysts. The test statistic 
values are both significant at the IX= .001 level; -3.57 for the articles with only a named industry 
analyst and-7.81 for all the articles. The latter subgroup also has a significant increase on the 
day prior to the event where the former does not. This corresponds to the buy recommendations 
in two ways: (1) the "all the articles" subgroup has more of an impact than the named industry 
analyst only articles, and (2) the significant increases prior to publication do not occur with 
named industry analysts only, but must be influenced by some other outside sources. 
The subgroup that contains no named industry analysts has a slightly stronger impact on 
the market on both the event day, t = 0, and the day prior, t = -1 than the buy recommendations 
dealing with the same subgroup. The values of the test statistic on days t = -1 and t = 0 are -2.44 
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and -2.49, respectively (Table 12). Unlike the buy recommendations, which were not significant 
at the a = . l 0 level, the sell recommendations are significant at the a = .025 level for 18 
observations. This still does not equal the influence of when named industry analysts are 
mentioned, but it does provide the basis for speculation on the part of sell recommendations. It 
appears the recommendations to sell a stock are met by a greater impact that the buy 
recommendations. This may be caused by the certainty of your gains or losses when you sell a 
stock versus the uncertainty with buying a stock. This is only speculation that has not been 
confirmed by any empirical tests. 
The final subgroup to be analyzed will be the combined named analysts - either named 
industry analyst or named portfolio / money manager. The two distinct subgroups are all articles 
that mention a named analyst (Table 13) and the articles that mention a named analyst only and 
no others (Table 14). These tables indicate that there is a distinction in the impact of the 
different subgroups . The articles that include any named analysts have higher test statistics on 
the event date and the day prior than the named analyst only subgroup. The test statistic for day t 
= -1 is -4.22 for the "all articles" subgroup and -2.73 for the "named articles only" subgroup . The 
-4.22 test statistic is significant at a = .00 l while the -2. 73 is only significant at the a = .005 
level. Day t = 0 has test statistic values of-7.79 for the "all articles" subgroup and -5.43 for 
"named articles only" . Both are significant at the a= .001 level of significance (see Figures 13 
and 14 ). Although the latter test statistic for day t = -1 is not significant at the same a level as 
the former, this is a minor issue. The common statistical standard in which to judge test statistics 
is a= .025 for a one-tailed test. Both of these values easily meet this criteria. They are 
compared to reveal their relative importance only. The "all articles" subgroup has a stronger 
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relative influence on the market than the "named articles only" subgroup, yet both are significant 
at rt values greater or equal to .005. 
The implication of statistical analysis on the named analysts reveals that there is an 
influence other than the named analysts themselves that is moving the market more than they are 
able to alone. The only factor available to make this impact is the un-named analysts. The un-
named analysts provide the additional influence needed to increase the impact the publication of 
the articles have on the stocks mentioned. 
SUMMARY 
The mentioning of different types of analysts and sources of information in the HOS 
articles cause very distinct differences in the way the market reacts to the stocks listed. 
Named portfolio/ money managers tend to elicit no response from the market when they 
are included in the article. The articles that mentioned only named portfolio / money managers 
had no significant stock price movements associated with the stocks they recommended. Named 
industry analysts, on the other hand, strongly influenced the stocks listed by moving the stock 
price significantly when they were mentioned in the article. When they were not included, the 
stocks failed to show any significant movements. 
Analyst / un-named sources also seemed to have no significant impact on the stock price 
of the firms they recommended. The other two groups of un-named analysts, un-named source 
but affiliated and company source, together provide a greater impact on stock prices than the 
analyst / un-named source alone. 
When dealing with named industry analysts, the impact of all the articles in which they 
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are mentioned is greater than the impact of the articles that mention them and no others. This is 
true for both the buy and sell recommendations. 
The combined named analysts for sell recommendations tend to produce stronger, more 
significant impacts on the price of a firms stock if they are combined with un-named analysts . 
This may revert back to the assumption that sell recommendations produce a stronger affect , in 
general, on market sentiment than buy recommendations. 
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Table 1 
All Portfolio / Money Managers 
-10 -0.007731 -2.483830 60 
-9 0.001728 0.555279 60 
-8 0.004240 1.362412 60 
-7 -0.002671 -0.858289 60 
-6 0.003551 1.141094 60 
-5 -0.000652 -0.209524 60 
-4 0.007010 2.252200 60 
-3 0.003950 1.269295 60 
-2 0.003417 1.098036 60 
-1 0.009844 3.162920 * 60 
0 0.013411 4.309038* 60 
1 -0.001800 -0.578386 60 
2 -0.001221 -0.392389 60 
3 -0.003653 -1.173706 60 
4 -0.000425 -0.136484 60 
5 0.001881 0.604433 60 
6 0.002840 0.912547 60 
7 0.00508 1 1.632555 60 
8 -0.000339 -0.109054 59 
9 0.001246 0.400244 59 
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No Portfolio / Money Managers 
-0.005462 -2.086245 117 
-0.001064 -0.40656 1 117 
-0.001485 -0.56727 1 117 
0.004305 1.644234 117 
0.000078 0.029800 117 
-0.001210 -0.462216 117 
0.002174 0.830400 117 
0.004480 1.710959 117 
0.008558 3.268531* 117 
0.009093 3.473038* 117 
0.009831 3.754835* 117 
0.002463 0.940799 117 
-0.001877 -0.716936 117 
-0.001219 -0.465589 117 
0.002535 0.968042 117 
0.001720 0.656797 117 
-0.000286 -0.109117 117 
0.000792 0.302642 117 
0.000634 0.24206 1 117 
0.000406 0.155200 117 
-0.001514 -0.578403 117 
Figure 2 
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 3 5 7 9 
Date Relative to Announcement Date 
Table 3 Table 4 
Only Portfolio/ Money Managers All Named Industry Analysts 
-10 -0.004952 -1.087754 24 -10 -0.004989 -2.183338 137 
-9 0.003438 0.755268 24 -9 -0.000740 -0.323910 137 
-8 0.001586 0.348369 24 -8 0.000782 0.342224 137 
-7 0.000693 0.152206 24 -7 0.001796 0.78599 1 137 
-6 0.004696 1.031694 24 -6 0.000676 0.296017 137 
-5 -0.000657 -0.144277 24 -5 -0.000396 -0.173263 137 
-4 0.006316 1.387567 24 -4 0.002962 1.296407 137 
-3 0.007410 1.627932 24 -3 0.00305 1 1.335245 137 
-2 -0.002578 -0.566393 24 -2 0.007995 3.498605 * 137 
-1 0.000896 0.196728 24 -1 0.010565 4.623238* 137 
0 0.000626 0.137519 24 0 0.013173 5.764431* 137 
1 -0.000880 -0.193367 24 1 0.001700 0.743958 137 
2 -0.002630 -0.577794 24 2 -0.000965 -0.422252 137 
3 -0.003160 -0.694143 24 3 -0.001343 -0.587524 137 
4 0.007103 1.560352 24 4 0.001822 0.797468 137 
5 0.006025 1.323543 24 5 0.000539 0.235954 137 
6 -0.001188 -0.261026 24 6 0.001339 0.585779 137 
7 -0.000457 -0.100459 24 7 0.001003 0.439040 137 
8 -0.004064 -0.892731 24 8 -0.001077 -0.471089 136 
9 -0.000651 -0.143003 24 9 0.001098 0.480287 136 
10 0.003294 0.723595 24 10 0.000130 0.056928 136 
Figure 3 Figure 4 
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Date Relative to Announcement Date Date Relative to Announcement Date 
* Significant Test Statistic 
Table 5 Table 6 
No Named Industry Analysts Only Named Industry Analysts 
-10 -0.008033 -2.003660 41 -10 -0.004909 -1.675245 92 
-9 0.002800 0.698339 41 -9 -0.001842 -0.628488 92 
-8 0.001396 0.348328 41 -8 -0.001994 -0.680496 92 
-7 0.000628 0.156544 41 -7 0.004843 1.652565 92 
-6 0.003584 0.894076 41 -6 -0.000766 -0.261345 92 
-5 -0.001349 -0.336606 41 -5 -0.001328 -0.452999 92 
-4 0.006788 1.693255 41 -4 0.002498 0.852222 92 
-3 0.008375 2.089046* 41 -3 0.004208 1.435732 92 
-2 0.003496 0.872000 41 -2 0.004595 1.567955 92 
-1 0.003468 0.865048 41 -1 0.002235 0.762803 92 
0 0.004799 1.197156 41 0 0.012905 4.403600* 92 
1 -0.002079 -0.518697 41 1 0.003334 1.137777 92 
2 -0.003289 -0.820405 41 2 -0.000486 -0.166005 92 
3 -0.002154 -0.537185 41 3 -0.000494 -0 .168447 92 
4 0.000383 0.095428 41 4 0.003163 1.079344 92 
5 0.004783 1.193117 41 5 0.001563 0.533481 92 
6 -0.000890 -0.222070 41 6 0.001482 0.505786 92 
7 0.006366 1.587840 41 7 -0.000787 -0.268413 92 
8 0.003371 0.840951 41 8 -0.000148 -0.050433 92 
9 -0.001988 -0.495779 41 9 -0.001061 -0.362152 92 
10 -0.000178 -0.044319 41 10 -0.001897 -0 .647418 92 
Figure 5 Figure 6 
C C 0.005 
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Date Relative to Announcement Date Date Relative to Announcement Date 
* Significant Test Statistic 
Table 7 
All Analysts I Un-Named Source 
-10 -0.006850 -1.223115 22 
-9 -0.006656 -1.188373 22 
-8 -0.001004 -0.179346 22 
-7 0.004323 0.771839 22 
-6 0.009280 1.656953 22 
-5 0.004363 0.778955 22 
-4 0.002448 0.437107 22 
-3 -0.004152 -0.741315 22 
-2 0.023573 4.208972* 22 
-1 0.026942 4.810556* 22 
0 0.000067 0.011932 22 
1 -0.004422 -0.789645 22 
2 -0.009543 -1.703993 22 
3 -0.000960 -0.171356 22 
4 -0.003280 -0.585738 22 
5 -0.009956 -1.777664 22 
6 -0.001408 -0.251408 22 
7 0.007203 1.286177 22 
8 0.008904 1.589904 22 
9 -0.004456 -0.795562 22 
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All Three Un-Named Analysts 
-0.002715 -0.663357 42 
0.000760 0.185820 42 
0.003675 0.898122 42 
0.001508 0.368591 42 
0.007203 1.760291 42 
0.001459 0.356526 42 
0.000963 0.235308 42 
0.000909 0.222095 42 
0.018368 4.488545* 42 
0.022161 5.415545* 42 
0.007920 1.935410 42 
-0.002084 -0.509184 42 
-0.003790 -0.926096 42 
-0.003157 -0.771400 42 
-0.003510 -0.857734 42 
-0.002767 -0.676230 42 
-0.001352 -0.330399 42 
0.004683 1.144441 42 
0.004321 1.055870 42 
-0.002532 -0.618639 42 
0.000179 0.043735 42 
Figure 8 
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No Analysts I Un-Named Source 
-0.005537 -2.620269 156 
0.000873 0.413101 156 
0.001166 0.551695 156 
0.001135 0.537335 156 
0.000185 0.087767 156 
-0.001401 -0.662899 156 
0.004051 1.917150 156 
0.005595 2.647925* 156 
0.004629 2.190743* 156 
0.006374 3.016565* 156 
0.012933 6.120241* 156 
0.001562 0.739165 156 
-0.000363 -0.171605 156 
-0.001680 -0.795117 156 
0.002202 1.042183 156 
0.003272 1.548480 156 
0.001035 0.489765 156 
0.001348 0.637783 156 
-0.001200 -0.567676 155 
0.000999 0.472624 155 
-0.000156 -0.073851 155 
Figure 9 
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Date Relative to Announcement Date 
































Only Named Industry Analysts 
0.007191 1.321976 27 
0.000473 0.086957 27 
-0.008467 -1.556383 27 
0.004742 0.871793 27 
-0.003245 -0.596580 27 
0.002989 0.549496 27 
-0.001653 -0.303893 27 
0.001066 0.195995 27 
-0.001175 -0.216023 27 
0.006888 1.266240 27 
-0.019434 -3.572521 * 27 
-0.006825 -1.254622 27 
-0.002015 -0.370419 27 
-0.000244 -0.044938 27 
0.006012 1.10516 1 27 
0.005355 0.984373 27 
0.002418 0.444433 27 
-0.003253 -0.597912 27 
-0.006426 -1.181218 26 
0.002222 0.408376 26 
0.000503 0.092433 26 
Figure 10 
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Date Relative to Announcement Date 
Table 11 
All Named Industry Analysts 
-10 0.001470 0.430729 59 
-9 0.002540 0.744061 59 
-8 -0.002823 -0.826833 59 
-7 0.004819 1.411666 59 
-6 -0.004939 -1.446888 59 
-5 -0.000276 -0.080970 59 
-4 -0.005740 -1.681486 59 
-3 -0.006995 -2.049078* 59 
-2 -0.002410 -0.705892 59 
-1 -0.012083 -3.539724* 59 
0 -0.026677 -7.814871* 59 
1 -0.004606 -1.349357 59 
2 0.003370 0.987248 59 
3 0.002772 0.812058 59 
4 0.006082 1.781728 59 
5 0.005324 1.559528 59 
6 0.001672 0.489832 59 
7 0.002956 0.865849 59 
8 -0.009259 -2.712378* 58 
9 0.000413 0.120841 57 
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No Named Industry Analysts 
-0.003374 -0.527453 18 
-0.004501 -0.703808 18 
-0.007767 -1.214444 18 
-0.015535 -2.428921* 18 
0.012690 1.984121 18 
0.000935 0.146147 18 
-0.000520 -0.081281 18 
0.000956 0.149421 18 
-0.000407 -0.063591 18 
-0.015634 -2.444430* 18 
-0.015959 -2.495278* 18 
0.000553 0.086524 18 
-0.006374 -0.996642 18 
0.008038 1.256753 18 
0.006640 1.038124 18 
-0.004973 -0.777595 18 
0.001103 0.172403 18 
0.002689 0.420445 18 
0.007094 1.109152 18 
-0.002653 -0.414828 18 
0.009154 1.431199 18 
Figure 12 
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All Named Analysts 
0.000812 0.266045 74 
0.001438 0.471495 74 
-0.004375 -1.434347 74 
0.000118 0.038845 74 
-0 .001263 -0.414019 74 
0.000201 0.065754 74 
-0.005096 -1.670620 74 
-0 .005416 -1.775429 74 
-0 .001176 -0.385372 74 
-0.012893 -4.226722* 74 
-0.023764 -7 .790479* 74 
-0.002996 -0.982123 74 
0.002288 0.750186 74 
0.001819 0.596399 74 
0.005376 1.762578 74 
0.002955 0.968626 74 
0.001392 0.456458 74 
0.003333 1.092777 74 
-0 .005379 -1.763359 73 
-0.000159 -0.052016 72 
0.002513 0.823716 72 
Figure 13 
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Only Named Analysts 
0.001882 0.516136 51 
0.000275 0.075387 51 
-0.004756 -1.304087 51 
-0 .002374 -0.65099 1 51 
-0.000328 -0.090009 51 
0.003770 1.033815 51 
-0.003401 -0 .932607 51 
-0.003765 -1 .032367 51 
-0.004344 -1 .191200 51 
-0.009977 -2 .735985 * 51 
-0.019818 -5.434587* 51 
-0.005344 -1.465472 51 
0.000869 0.238228 51 
0.001140 0.312583 51 
0.006718 1.842148 51 
0.001160 0.317977 51 
0.000995 0.272724 51 
0.002297 0.629996 51 
-0.008233 -2.257674* 50 
0.003273 0.897545 50 
0.000956 0.262229 50 
Figure 14 
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